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THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION
 THE FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREVIOUSLY
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1. The primary Soviet objective in the proposed meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers is the prevention of West German rearmament. The secondary, or long-range, objective is the withdrawal of the Western occupation forces from Germany, and eventually the withdrawal of American and British forces from the continent of Europe.
2. The basic method for achieving the Soviet objectives will be an attempt to limit the agenda to the subject of West German rearmament, which offers an opportunity for playing on the fear of Germany prevalent in France and in the Soviet satellites, while the German fear of the Soviet Union and the British tendency to caution would contribute to division among the Western Allies and promote anti-American sentiment. The first concession on the matter of the agenda will be an agreement to include the problem of a general settlement of German issues; this will afford an opportunity to appeal to the German desire for unity. The Soviet position would be based on the Prague communiqué and the Grotewohl letter, possibly with concessions on the questions of the "People's Police" and the size of Soviet occupation forces. The Russians will certainly make much of the argument that West German rearmament and the present division of Germany represent violations by the West of the Potsdam and Yalta agreements.
3. Soviet tactics on the agenda are based on the realization that the Soviet position is, for the first time since 1945, weaker than the Western position, and that every concession in the direction of broadening the agenda makes it weaker by exposing the Soviet Union's vulnerable spots—such questions as the size of the occupation forces, the People's Police, the Austrian treaty, the satellite armies, and Soviet political domination of the satellites.
4. With regard to the police, the Russians may be expected to cite the recent reduction in strength from 39 to 24 Bereitschaften, glossing over the facts that some 14 schools continue to exist, that each of the 24 Bereitschaften has been reorganized that it is now almost identical structurally with a Soviet mechanized regiment, that combining three Bereitschaften into a single unit would produce the equivalent of a division, and that the existing Bereitschaften when thus combined and reinforced by the addition of 40 per cent. more enlisted personnel would amount to eight divisions.

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